The recent meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the head of Taiwan's main opposition party, Cheng Li-wun, has sparked discussions about Beijing's strategy and its potential impact on cross-strait relations. This encounter, a decade after Xi's last meeting with a KMT leader, carries symbolic weight, but its practical implications may be more limited. The article delves into the complexities of Beijing's approach, highlighting the challenges it faces in conveying its message of peace amidst rising tensions with the United States and Taiwan's growing independence movement.
One of the key points of focus is Beijing's insistence on peaceful unification, even while it reserves the right to use force. This stance is particularly significant in the current geopolitical landscape, where China aims to distinguish itself from the United States, which is perceived as a strategic competitor. The article emphasizes that peace in the Taiwan Strait is a central priority for Beijing, especially given the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the anxiety among Asian countries about potential military conflicts. However, the author argues that Beijing's efforts to promote peaceful unification have not been widely recognized internationally, as they are often overshadowed by China's expanding military pressure on Taiwan.
The author also discusses the role of opposition politicians, such as KMT leaders, and groups that oppose Taiwan independence in engaging with Chinese officials. While these interactions have not garnered much international credit, they are crucial for Beijing's strategy. The article highlights the contradiction Beijing faces, where every signal of peace is undermined by the coercive backdrop of China's actions. The meeting between Xi and Cheng Li-wun is seen as an attempt to address this contradiction and reinforce Beijing's commitment to peace.
However, the author points out that the impact of this meeting is constrained by the domestic political dynamics in Taiwan. The KMT leadership's reluctance to embrace the '1992 Consensus' unequivocally, due to the perceived domestic political costs, has created a challenge for Beijing. The '1992 Consensus' is now widely regarded in Taiwan as benefiting Beijing more than Taipei, and many Taiwanese even believe it to be Beijing's proposal of 'one country, two systems'. This misunderstanding has made the consensus controversial within the KMT and less appealing to the wider electorate.
The article further explores the implications of the meeting for the KMT and its leadership. While the meeting may strengthen Cheng Li-wun's standing within the party and provide her with political capital, it is unlikely to significantly impact the broader political balance in Taiwan. The author argues that the KMT's caution over the past decade has revealed a basic political reality: most Taiwanese voters are uncomfortable with the 1992 Consensus as defined by Beijing. The meeting's impact is further limited by the DPP government's resistance to certain policy measures and the public's growing suspicion of Beijing-linked initiatives.
The timing of the meeting is also significant, especially with the looming Xi-Trump meeting. Beijing aims to signal its influence within Taiwan and strengthen its hand in negotiations with the United States. However, the author notes that Xi remains the more defensive player in the US-China contest, as Washington has set the pace on various economic and military measures. The article concludes by comparing the current situation with the Xi-Ma meeting in 2015, highlighting the differences in context and the challenges Beijing faces in achieving its political goals.
